Democratic Stability and Backsliding in Nigeria: Institutional Reforms, Constitutional Consensus, and the Role of Polarization
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Keywords

Democratic backsliding
democratic stability
Nigeria
institutional reform
political theory

Abstract

This paper explores the challenges of democratic stability and backsliding in Nigeria, focusing on the interplay between institutional design, constitutional consensus, and polarization. While Nigeria has made significant strides in transitioning to democracy since 1999, its democratic institutions remain fragile, with recurring issues such as electoral malpractice, judicial interference, and elite manipulation undermining public trust. Drawing on the institutional account of stability, the paper argues that self-enforcing institutions—such as independent electoral commissions, transparent judicial systems, and robust campaign finance regulations—are essential for incentivizing compliance with democratic norms. Additionally, the paper examines the role of constitutional consensus in fostering public trust and the impact of polarization on enabling strategies like stealth, packaging, and uncertainty, which leaders use to erode democratic norms. By addressing these challenges through targeted reforms, Nigeria can strengthen its democratic resilience and mitigate the risk of backsliding. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for enhancing electoral integrity, judicial independence, and civic engagement in Nigeria.

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