

# THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ACT (PIA) AND THE FUTURE OF WORK IN THE NIGERIAN OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING, SKILL RECOMPOSITION, AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

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**Abstract:** The enactment of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) 2021 marks a watershed in Nigeria's oil and gas sector, aiming to foster transparency, attract investment, and redefine the role of the state. However, its profound implications for the industrial sociology of the sector—specifically workforce restructuring, skill recomposition, and industrial relations—remain critically underexplored. This paper interrogates the Act's impact on the future of work by analyzing the drivers and consequences of organizational change within International Oil Companies (IOCs) and the newly commercialized NNPC Limited. Drawing on Labour Process Theory and the Strategic Choice Framework, the research employs a qualitative methodology based on extensive document analysis of company reports, policy documents, and union communications. Findings indicate that the PIA's market-driven logic is accelerating workforce rationalization, a shift towards precarious contract-based employment, and a strategic divestment from onshore assets, transferring labour management to indigenous firms with different industrial relations practices. Concurrently, the industry faces a mounting skills gap, necessitating a recomposition towards capabilities in gas, renewables, and digitalization, for which the current national educational infrastructure is underprepared. These changes are reconfiguring the tripartite industrial relations dynamics, challenging traditional unions like PENGASSAN and NUPENG, and testing the state's dual role as regulator and employer. The study concludes that while the PIA promises sectoral modernization, its success is contingent on proactive policies for just labour transitions, robust social dialogue, and strategic human capital development to mitigate social unrest and harness emerging opportunities.

**Keywords:** Petroleum Industry Act; Industrial Sociology; Workforce Restructuring; Skill Recomposition; Industrial Relations; Nigeria, Oil and Gas.

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## INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian oil and gas industry has, for over six decades, served as the fundamental bedrock of the nation's economy, accounting for the vast majority of government revenue and foreign exchange earnings. Yet, this economic centrality has been perpetually shadowed by a complex web of governance challenges, fiscal inefficiencies, resource control conflicts, and protracted political debates over the optimal management of the country's hydrocarbon resources. The governance architecture of the sector, long defined by the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the existence of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), was widely criticized for its opacity, inefficiency, and inability to spur sufficient investment, particularly in deep-water and gas infrastructure development. For nearly two decades, the journey towards comprehensive legislative reform was stalled by deep-seated political and economic interests, creating a climate of regulatory uncertainty that deterred investment and stifled growth.

The signing into law of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) in August 2021 therefore represents a monumental shift, arguably the most significant economic legislation in Nigeria in over fifty years. The PIA is a holistic framework designed to overhaul the sector's governance, administrative, regulatory, and fiscal structures. Its key provisions include the commercialisation of the NNPC into NNPC Limited, a profit-driven entity governed by the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA); the creation of distinct regulatory bodies for upstream (NUPRC) and midstream/downstream (NMDPRA) operations; the introduction of new fiscal terms aimed at attracting investment; and a renewed emphasis on gas development and host community engagement. The primary discourse surrounding the PIA, both in academic and policy circles, has predominantly centred on these macro-level fiscal, regulatory, and governance implications.

However, a critical dimension that has received scant attention is the Act's profound impact on the micro-level social structures of the industry – specifically its workforce. The oil and gas sector is not merely a collection of financial flows and technical processes; it is a complex social field comprising a highly skilled workforce, powerful labour unions, intricate employment relationships, and deeply embedded industrial relations practices. The PIA, by fundamentally altering the operating environment for firms, inevitably triggers a cascade of changes within this social field. Its market-liberalizing ethos promotes efficiency, cost-competitiveness, and commercial viability, values that directly conflict with the historically entrenched practices of job security, extensive benefits, and strong unionization that characterized work in the major IOCs and the old NNPC.

This research paper, therefore, seeks to bridge this scholarly gap by interrogating the PIA's ramifications from an industrial sociology perspective. It posits that the Act is not just an economic policy but a potent force reshaping the future of work in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The central argument is that the implementation of the PIA is acting as a catalyst for three interconnected processes: extensive workforce restructuring through rationalization and precaritization; a significant recomposition of required skills towards new energy and digital paradigms; and a fundamental reconfiguration of the

decades-old industrial relations system. By examining these dynamics, this study moves beyond the technocratic analysis of the PIA to explore its human and social consequences, arguing that the ultimate success of the reform will depend as much on managing its socioeconomic impact on the workforce as on its fiscal and regulatory soundness.

## LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The scholarly discourse on the Nigerian oil and gas industry is vast, yet it can be broadly categorized into distinct streams. A significant body of literature focuses on the **resource curse** paradigm, exploring the paradox of poverty amidst plenty and the political economy of oil revenue management (Karl, 1997; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2013). Another major strand examines governance and institutional failures, critiquing the NNPC's inefficiency and the sector's history of corruption (Shaxson, 2007; Obi & Rustad, 2011). Furthermore, extensive research exists on conflict and community relations in the Niger Delta, analyzing the dynamics of militancy, oil theft, and environmental degradation (Watts, 2004; Ikelegbe, 2005).

While these works provide essential context, they often treat the industry as a monolithic entity, overlooking its internal social structures. The sociology of work in the extractive industries, particularly in Africa, offers a more relevant foundation. This literature examines how corporate strategies, state policies, and global markets shape employment relations, class formation, and worker agency (Alexander, 2010; Capps, 2016). In the Nigerian context, studies have explored the historical development of a labour aristocracy within the IOCs, the role of powerful unions like PENGASSAN and NUPENG, and the segmentation between core permanent staff and a peripheral contract workforce (Adejugbe, 2004; Uchendu, 2010). The current research builds on this foundation by analyzing how the PIA disrupts these established patterns.

To theorize this disruption, this paper employs two complementary theoretical frameworks from industrial sociology. First, Labour Process Theory (LPT), originating from Braverman (1974) and refined by Burawoy (1979), provides tools to analyze management's strategies to control labour and extract maximum surplus value. The PIA's emphasis on cost-efficiency and commercial viability can be interpreted as a new phase in the capital accumulation process, necessitating a restructuring of the labour process. This may manifest through deskilling (replacing high-wage skilled workers with technology or cheaper labour), intensification (demanding higher productivity from remaining workers), and the casualization of employment to reduce fixed labour costs and weaken collective bargaining power (Thompson & Smith, 2009). The transition of NNPC into a commercial entity is a prime site for observing these LPT dynamics in action, as management seeks to align its workforce with private sector benchmarks.

Second, the Strategic Choice Framework developed by Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986) offers a multi-level perspective to understand changes in industrial relations. It posits that outcomes are not predetermined by economic forces alone but are shaped by the strategic choices made by key actors at three levels: the strategic level (corporate business and HR strategies), the functional level (collective bargaining and personnel policies), and the workplace level (day-to-day job design and supervision). The PIA

creates a new institutional environment that alters the constraints and opportunities for these actors—the state (as regulator and shareholder), the management of IOCs and NNPC Ltd., and the trade unions. Their strategic responses—whether towards conflict, cooperation, or evasion—will collectively determine the new industrial relations landscape. For instance, an IOC's strategic choice to divest from onshore operations is a top-level business decision that directly impacts functional-level bargaining and workplace job security.

By integrating Labour Process Theory with the Strategic Choice Framework, this study can critically analyze both the structural drivers of change (the economic imperatives of the PIA) and the agency of key actors in negotiating and shaping the outcomes of this change on the future of work. This theoretical combination allows for a nuanced examination that avoids both economic determinism and an overestimation of actor autonomy.

### **HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF WORK IN THE NIGERIAN OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY**

To fully apprehend the transformative potential of the PIA, one must first understand the historical socio-industrial order it seeks to reform. The evolution of work in Nigeria's oil sector has been characterized by a distinct tripartite structure and a legacy of privilege and conflict. From its inception in the late 1950s, the industry was dominated by International Oil Companies (IOCs) like Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, and ENI. These firms established employment practices that created a distinct class of labour aristocrats (Adejogbe, 2004). Nigerian employees in the core operations of these IOCs enjoyed unparalleled job security, high wages, extensive benefits packages (including high-quality housing, healthcare, and education for their children), and generous pension schemes. This was, in part, a strategy to secure a stable and loyal workforce and to mitigate the risks of operating in a post-colonial context.

Alongside this emerged a powerful trade union movement. The Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), representing senior and professional staff, and the Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG), representing junior staff, became two of the most influential and militant unions in the country. Their power was derived from the strategic importance of the sector; any industrial action would instantly cripple the national economy, granting them significant leverage in negotiations with both the IOCs and the federal government (Uchendu, 2010). The industrial relations system was therefore characterized by periodic, but potent, cycles of conflict and negotiation, resulting in collective bargaining agreements that further cemented the privileged status of the unionized workforce.

The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), established in 1977, evolved as a unique hybrid—a state-owned enterprise with quasi-regulatory functions. Its employment culture blended the bureaucracy and job security of the civil service with the compensation patterns of the IOCs, though often without the same level of efficiency and productivity. NNPC became a vehicle for political patronage, leading to chronic overstaffing and operational inefficiencies (Shaxson, 2007). Its relationship with its own unions was complex, often mediated by the federal government as the ultimate employer.

Beneath this layer of privileged permanent employees existed a vast and growing **subcontracting workforce**. To cut costs and manage fluctuating workloads, the IOCs and NNPC increasingly relied on a network of Nigerian and foreign contracting firms for services ranging from catering and security to core engineering and maintenance. This created a stark dualism in the labour market: a small, protected, unionized core and a large, precarious, non-unionized periphery of contract workers who performed similar tasks for lower pay, fewer benefits, and no job security (Adeleye, 2015). This segmentation was a persistent source of tension and occasional unrest, as seen in the frequent protests and strikes by contract workers.

The global oil price crash of 2014-2016 was a critical juncture that exposed the unsustainable cost structures of this model. IOCs embarked on massive global layoffs and began aggressively pursuing divestment of their onshore and shallow-water assets, selling them to smaller, nimbler indigenous companies like Seplat, Aiteo, and Sahara Energy. These Indigenous Oil Companies (IndOCs) typically operated with leaner staffing models, different management cultures, and less tolerance for the traditional industrial relations practices of the IOCs (Ovadia, 2016). The PIA, therefore, did not create the trend of restructuring but rather institutionalized and accelerated it, providing a legal and regulatory framework that makes cost-efficiency and commercialization the central tenets of the industry's future. The Act is the legislative culmination of this historical shift towards a more market-oriented, and consequently, a more flexible and potentially precarious, world of work.

### **WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING AND THE NEW ECONOMY OF PRECARIETY**

The implementation of the Petroleum Industry Act has acted as a powerful accelerant for deep-seated trends in workforce restructuring, fundamentally altering employment relationships and amplifying precarity. This restructuring is manifesting through several key strategies driven by the PIA's core principles of commerciality, cost-efficiency, and competition. The commercialization of the NNPC into NNPC Limited is arguably the most significant driver of restructuring. As a CAMA-regulated commercial entity, NNPC Ltd. is now mandated to operate profitably, declare dividends, and fund its operations from its own revenue rather than state allocations. This necessitates a radical departure from its past as a bureaucratic, overstaffed state corporation. Management is now under immense pressure to streamline operations and reduce its bloated wage bill, a classic response predicted by Labour Process Theory. This has already triggered waves of voluntary and involuntary severance schemes, early retirement programs, and internal reorganizations aimed at rightsizing the workforce. For instance, following its incorporation, NNPC Ltd. announced departmental reorganizations and a performance-driven culture, directly linking employee retention and advancement to productivity and commercial contribution, a stark contrast to the previous tenure-based system (NNPC, 2022).

Concurrently, the IOCs are deepening their strategic divestment from onshore and shallow-water assets, a process that the PIA's clearer regulatory framework facilitates. The sale of these assets to Indigenous Oil Companies (IndOCs) invariably leads to

significant workforce transitions. Employees previously on the payroll of an IOC like Shell or ExxonMobil are often transferred to the new indigenous owner under the terms of the Assets Purchase Agreement (APA). However, these transitions frequently involve renegotiation of employment terms. IndOCs, operating with lower profit margins and a different risk appetite, often seek to harmonize conditions to their typically leaner and more flexible HR structures, which may result in reduced benefits or changes to work patterns (Ovadia, 2016). For some workers, this transition from a major IOC to a smaller local firm represents a descent from the core to a more precarious segment of the labour market.

The most pervasive form of restructuring is the continued and systematic shift from direct employment to contractual labour. The drive for operational expenditure (OPEX) reduction, intensified by the PIA's competitive ethos, makes the expensive permanent workforce a primary target for cost-cutting. Companies are increasingly outsourcing non-core and even core functions to service contractors. This creates a triangular employment relationship where the worker has a contract with a service firm (e.g., Daewoo, Saipem, or a Nigerian-owned service company) but works under the daily supervision of the oil company (IOC or IndOC). This model allows the oil companies to externalize risks, reduce long-term liabilities, and gain numerical flexibility, aligning with global trends of labour flexibilization (Standing, 2011). For the workforce, it means the erosion of the traditional benefits of oil sector employment: job security, career progression, and union protection. This growing precarity is a direct outcome of management's strategic choices, enabled by the PIA's framework, to reconfigure the labour process for maximum capital efficiency.

## **SKILL RECOMPOSITION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW ENERGY PARADIGMS**

The PIA is not solely a story of job reduction; it is also a catalyst for a significant recomposition of the skill sets required within the industry. The Act's explicit push towards gas utilization, its implicit encouragement of renewable energy integration, and the overarching global energy transition are collectively driving a demand for new capabilities, creating both a skills gap and a window of opportunity for strategic human capital development.

The PIA's bold emphasis on gas as a transition fuel and for domestic industrialization is a central policy shift. Titles 2 and 3 of the Act provide a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for midstream gas infrastructure, gas pricing, and domestic gas obligations. This is stimulating massive investments in gas processing facilities, liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains, and gas-fired power plants. Consequently, demand is surging for skills that were previously niche: gas engineers, pipeline specialists, LNG plant operators, gas economists, and experts in gas trading and marketing (Oguine, 2021). The existing workforce, predominantly trained in crude oil exploration and production, requires significant upskilling and reskilling to meet this new demand. The skill mix is shifting from a focus on petroleum engineering to a greater emphasis on chemical and gas process engineering.

Furthermore, the global energy transition, though not explicitly mandated in the PIA, looms large over the strategic planning of all sector operators. IOCs are under immense pressure from their shareholders and home governments to decarbonize operations and invest in renewable energy. This is leading to the emergence of new roles within the Nigerian operations of these companies. There is a growing, though still nascent, demand for specialists in carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS), flaring reduction technologies, biofuels, hydrogen, and even solar and wind energy project development (Eweje, 2020). The ability of the Nigerian educational system – universities, polytechnics, and vocational training centres – to produce graduates with these skills is currently limited, creating a critical skills gap that threatens to be filled by expatriates unless urgent action is taken.

Digitization and automation represent another axis of skill recomposition. To achieve the PIA's efficiency goals, companies are increasingly investing in digital oil field technologies, data analytics, artificial intelligence for predictive maintenance, and automated drilling and production systems. This reduces the demand for manual and routine tasks but increases the need for data scientists, cybersecurity experts, software engineers, and technicians capable of maintaining sophisticated automated systems (World Economic Forum, 2020). This technological shift further exacerbates the skills divide, privileging a new generation of tech-savvy workers while potentially marginalizing those with traditional, non-digital technical skills.

The challenge, therefore, is twofold. First, there is a pressing need for a massive reskilling and upskilling initiative for the current workforce to prevent large-scale obsolescence and to equip them for the industry's new directions. Second, there is a need for a fundamental reform of tertiary and vocational education curricula to align with the future needs of the energy sector, encompassing both hydrocarbons and renewables. The failure to address this skills recomposition strategically will result in a mismatch where the industry cannot find the talent it needs to evolve, while thousands of experienced workers face unemployment due to their skills becoming outdated.

## **RECONFIGURING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND UNION RELEVANCE**

The tectonic shifts in workforce structure and skill demands triggered by the PIA are simultaneously destabilizing the established industrial relations ecosystem, forcing a recalibration of power and strategy among unions, employers, and the state. The traditional model, characterized by powerful unions bargaining with a few large IOCs and a state-owned NNPC, is giving way to a more fragmented, complex, and challenging landscape. The most direct threat to union power is the aforementioned rise of precarious contract employment. PENGASSAN and NUPENG have historically derived their strength from organizing the permanent, core workforce of the major operators. As companies outsource more functions, the number of directly employed, unionizable workers shrinks. Organizing the geographically dispersed, financially insecure, and often fearful contract workforce is a monumental challenge for the unions (Adeleye, 2015). Furthermore, the use of contract labour is a deliberate strategy by management to bypass collective bargaining, as the primary employer is the service company, not the oil major.

This fragmentation of the employer base weakens the unions' ability to engage in industry-wide bargaining and diminishes their strike leverage, as a dispute with one small service contractor does not have the same national impact as a dispute with Shell or Chevron.

The changing portfolio of companies also alters industrial relations dynamics. The divestment of assets from IOCs to Indigenous Oil Companies (IndOCs) transfers union members to new employers with different management cultures. While some IndOCs may be collaborative, others are known for their resistance to traditional union activism and their preference for individualized, non-union employment relations (Ovadia, 2016). Unions often find themselves having to re-establish recognition agreements and renegotiate terms and conditions from scratch with these new entities, a process that is resource-intensive and uncertain. The rise of these new actors fragments the previously unified employer front, complicating the bargaining landscape for unions.

The commercialization of NNPC Ltd. places the state in a profound dilemma, a tension central to the Strategic Choice Framework. As the majority shareholder, the state has an interest in NNPC Ltd. being profitable and efficient, which may necessitate workforce rationalization and resisting union demands for wage increases. Yet, as the sovereign government, it has a responsibility to maintain industrial peace, protect workers' rights, and prevent social unrest. This dual role creates inherent contradictions. For the unions, bargaining with NNPC Ltd. is now fundamentally different. They can no longer as easily appeal to the government as a benevolent employer-of-last-resort; they must now negotiate with a management team driven by commercial imperatives. This redefines the very nature of the bargaining process, moving it from a political dialogue to a more conventional, and often more adversarial, capital-labour negotiation.

In response to these existential challenges, PENGASSAN and NUPENG are being forced to adapt their strategies. This includes attempting to organize the contract workforce more aggressively, exploring new forms of representation, forming alliances with civil society organizations focused on energy transition justice, and engaging in broader policy advocacy around the just transition. Their ability to evolve from protectors of a labour aristocracy to representatives of a broader, more precarious energy workforce will determine their continued relevance in the PIA era.

#### **CASE STUDY: NNPC LIMITED AND THE CHALLENGES OF STRATEGIC CHOICE**

A focused examination of NNPC Limited provides a potent microcosm of the broader themes of restructuring, skill shift, and industrial relations reconfiguration. Its transformation from a state corporation to a commercial entity encapsulates the central tensions and strategic choices outlined in this paper. The strategic imperative for NNPC Ltd. is clear: achieve profitability and operational efficiency to survive in a competitive market. This top-level business strategy directly dictates its functional-level human resource strategy. Management's choice has been to embark on a profound organizational restructuring. This has involved merging departments, dissolving redundant units, and introducing a performance management system that emphasizes accountability and commercial results over seniority (NNPC, 2022). A key initiative has been the

introduction of the "Accountability, Performance, and Excellence" mantra, which is being used to drive a cultural change away from civil service complacency towards a dynamic, profit-oriented corporate culture.

This strategic shift has direct implications for the workforce. Voluntary Separation Schemes (VSS) have been deployed to reduce headcount in a managed way. However, this process is fraught with tension. The choice of who leaves and who stays is a critical strategic decision. There is a risk that the push for rapid downsizing could lead to a "brain drain," where experienced but expensive senior staff take the package, leaving the company with a skills shortage in critical areas. Conversely, the company may seek to retain talent with skills aligned to its new commercial and gas-focused strategy while letting go of those in functions deemed redundant. This process is a clear example of Labour Process Theory in action, where management redesigns the organization to gain greater control over the labour process and its costs.

For the unions within NNPC Ltd., primarily PENGASSAN, this transformation represents an unprecedented challenge. Their traditional bargaining counterpart—a government entity susceptible to political pressure—has been replaced by a management team armed with a commercial mandate. The unions' strategic choices are limited and difficult. They can resist the changes through industrial action, but this would directly undermine the company's commercial viability and could attract public criticism for obstructing a crucial national reform. Alternatively, they can engage in a social dialogue to negotiate the terms of the transition, focusing on securing the best possible severance packages for departing staff, guarantees for those who remain, and retraining programs to reskill the workforce for the company's new direction. This case illustrates the dynamic interplay of strategic choices at all levels, shaping the future of work within the nation's most significant energy company.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Petroleum Industry Act 2021 is far more than a regulatory and fiscal statute; it is a profound social intervention recalibrating the very fabric of work in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. This research has demonstrated that the Act's implementation is acting as a powerful catalyst for three interconnected transformations: the restructuring of the workforce towards more precarious and flexible employment models; the recomposition of skills towards gas, renewables, and digitalization; and the reconfiguration of a once-stable industrial relations system, challenging the relevance of traditional unions. These changes are not accidental byproducts but are direct consequences of the PIA's core logic of market liberalization, commercial viability, and cost efficiency.

The findings, analyzed through the lenses of Labour Process Theory and the Strategic Choice Framework, reveal a sector at a crossroads. The drive for efficiency is creating winners and losers: a new class of tech-savvy and gas-specialized professionals may thrive, while a larger group of workers with traditional skills faces job insecurity and deskilling. The shift to NNPC Ltd. and the rise of IndOCs are creating a more diverse but also more fragmented employer landscape, complicating collective bargaining and

worker representation. The promise of a modernized, investment-friendly sector is thus shadowed by the risks of heightened precarity, social unrest, and a debilitating skills gap. Therefore, the ultimate success of the PIA will not be measured by investment figures alone, but by its ability to foster a **just transition** for the workforce. To achieve this, a multi-stakeholder approach is imperative. Based on the analysis, this paper proposes the following recommendations:

1. **For the Nigerian Government and Regulators (NUPRC/NMDPRA):**

- Develop a clear "**Just Transition for Labour**" framework that integrates workforce planning into the implementation of the PIA. This should include funding for large-scale reskilling and upskilling programs, focused on gas technology, renewable energy, and digital skills.
- Strengthen labour provisions within regulatory frameworks to discourage the indiscriminate casualization of labour and ensure that contract workers enjoy fundamental rights and protections.
- Facilitate social dialogue by creating tripartite forums (government, employers, unions) to proactively address the social dimensions of energy transition and divestment.

2. **For Companies (IOCs, NNPC Ltd., IndOCs):**

- Move beyond a cost-cutting approach to workforce management and invest in strategic human capital development. This includes partnering with educational institutions and launching internal training academies to bridge the emerging skills gap.
- Engage in meaningful social dialogue with unions during restructuring processes, ensuring transparency and fairness in severance schemes and workforce transitions.
- Extend ethical labour standards to contract workers in their value chain, ensuring fair wages and safe working conditions.

3. **For Trade Unions (PENGASSAN and NUPENG):**

- Adapt organizing strategies to better represent the growing population of contract and precarious workers in the sector.
- Develop expertise in energy transition policies to engage constructively in debates on the future of the sector and advocate for retraining and job creation in new energy fields.
- Shift from a purely confrontational posture to a more strategic combination of bargaining, advocacy, and partnership where possible.

In conclusion, the PIA has set in motion an irreversible process of change. The future of work in the Nigerian oil and gas industry will be less secure, more technologically advanced, and require new skills. The central challenge for policymakers, corporate leaders, and labour representatives is to manage this transition with a commitment to equity and social justice, ensuring that the benefits of reform are broadly shared and its costs are not borne solely by the workforce. The PIA's legacy will be defined not just by the investment it attracts, but by the society it helps to build.

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